Guest post by Mark Allen
Haverty
The United States being as new as it is in the greater scheme of things makes
us think of wars being based on relatively recent matters – after all,
all of ours are. Europe of course shows us over an over again that the roots
of wars run very deep, often centuries of hatred. An assassination might have
launched World War I, but the reasons behind it were ages old hatreds. That
war never really ended, either, with the Treaty of Versailles doing little more
than clamp down some of the hatreds temporarily – most erupting just decades
later in World War II, others taking nearly a century to boil over, such as
the former Yugoslavia and the current situation in Iraq.
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| TM articles of interest: “The Pipeline War: Russian bear goes for West’s jugular” Dangerous Game Georgia: oil, neocons, cold war and our credibility |
The ethnic hatreds and feuds of Eastern Europe and Central Asia follow a similar
pattern, with centuries of hostilities kept under wraps by brutal dictatorships,
with the rage boiling over in to violence with the yolk of oppression finally
removed. With the fall of the Soviet Union, rather than working together to
advance mutual goals, too many of the peoples of this former empire have instead
chosen to try to once again kill one another.
The conflict boiling over in South Ossetia today is far from a new one. A Persian
people surrounded by ethnicities with nothing in common with them, Ossetians
have found themselves trapped for centuries between the Russians and Georgians.
In 1801, the swallowing of Georgia by the Russian Empire would temporarily reunite
Ossetians under one rule – albeit not their own – and conflict would
be stifled, for now.
With the fall of the Empire, the tensions would flare up again, and rival Communist
forces would use the two sides to fight their battles, with the Menshevik Georgians
facing uprisings from 1918 through 1920 in the region now known as South Ossetia,
with the Ossetians receiving support from the Bolsheviks. In 1921, Georgian
independence would come to an end, with Ossetians being a contributing force
to this, as they would aid the invading Red Army. If the Ossetians could not
be free, neither would the Georgians.
The reward for the Ossetians would be a modicum of their own autonomy, as
the Soviets would carve out the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast for them, although
autonomy under Soviet rule is far from true autonomy. Still, this semi-independence
would last until 1990, when the Georgian SSR would dissolve it, shortly before
the Georgian SSR itself would dissolve, transforming in to the Republic of Georgia,
which officially declared its independence from the USSR on April 9, 1991.
Before declaring their independence, Georgians would first declare war on the
Ossetians. Conflict would continue from January 1991 through June 1992, with
the result being over 1,000 dead and approximately 110, 000 refugees. [i] The
result of the war would be the creation of a semi-autonomous region of South
Ossetia within Georgia, operating as a de facto state of its own, with peacekeeping
forces consisting of Russian, North Ossetian (which, technically, would also
be Russian), and Georgian forces.
While a semblance of peace and semi-autonomy were established, it was not enough
for the South Ossetians, who voted in 1992 for independence and who have continued
to press for it. A second referendum, monitored by international organizations,
saw 95% of the populace vote in favor of secession from Georgia. However, there
were questions about the legitimacy of this vote, based on the lack of involvement
by ethnic Georgians.
In fact, many Georgians, along with a minority of Ossetians, participated in
counter-elections, forming an opposition government to the opposition government
already operating within South Ossetia. Neither government has received international
recognition, but many Ossetians had seen the newer of the two, led by Dmitri
Sanakoev, who had formerly been a minister within the initial breakaway government,
as a further interference by Georgians in their affairs and a puppet government
of the Georgians. Georgia did itself little good in this regard by later giving
semi-recognition to the latter of the two governments, dubbing them the “Provisional
Administrative Entity of South Ossetia.” As the International Crisis Group
observed, “The establishment of Dmitri Sanakoev and his alternative power
centre in the Georgian-administered areas in the zone of conflict is alienating
the broader Ossetian constituency.” [ii]
After recognizing the government more friendly to their cause, Georgia attempted
to use the carrot rather than the stick in attempting to rein in the South Ossetians.
Georgia would invest heavily in the development of Kurta, the capital of the
Sanakoev government, during 2007, with $10 million in Georgian funds going towards
shops, a movie theatre, and a hotel. [iii]
The trigger for the latest violence is not anything occurring in the Caucasus
but in the Balkans. As Kosovo pushed for independence, Russia, which opposed
such a move due to their historical alliances with Serbia, warned that what
was good for Kosovo would be good for other areas as well. Former Russian President
and current Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has stated, “If people believe
that Kosovo can be granted full independence, why then should we deny it to
Abkhazia and South Ossetia?” [iv] The Russians warned of this again in
February, as the Russian foreign ministry released a statement saying, “We
will, without doubt, have to take into account a declaration and recognition
of Kosovo independence in connection with the situation in Abkhazia and South
Ossetia.” [v] Further angering Russia were overtures from NATO that they
would welcome Georgia in to the organization. This move, which Russians felt
was an intrusion upon their sphere, led to a further supporting of separatists
within the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. [vi]
Minor skirmishes kicked off the beginning of August, and Russia began allowing
refugees from South Ossetia to evacuate into North Ossetia on Sunday, August
3. By Friday, over 2,000 had done so. [vii] By Thursday, these minor skirmishes
became a bombardment of Tskhinvali, the capital of the separatist government,
by Georgian forces, and a ground invasion on August 8. While Georgian forces
early on would take the city, the tide turned quickly.
By the end of Friday, joint Russian/Ossetian forces would retake Tskhinvali,
with Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili stating that 150 Russian tanks had
crossed the Georgian/Russian border. As far as the Russians are concerned, they
acted to defend citizens that have become more likely since 2006 to carry Russian
passports than Georgian, and who were under an unprovoked attack by the Georgian
government. To the Georgians, this violation of their border by the Russians
is tantamount to a declaration of war by the Russians, and they are calling
for international support.
Conflict became more severe on Saturday, and there are significant civilian
casualties mounting in South Ossetia and, to a lesser degree, Georgia proper.
The BBC reports that Russian and South Ossetian officials are reporting at least
1,400 dead, the majority civilian, while there are around 37 – 50 dead
civilians on the Georgian side.
Why now has this erupted as it has? Clearly, the provocation for the conflict
comes from the Georgians, but it is doubtful that the Russians do not welcome
it. The Georgians likely felt that the presence of Prime Minister Putin, considered
the “true” head of the Russian government, at the Olympics rather
than in Moscow might make the Russians less likely to respond. In addition,
there is some belief that the Georgians might have thought they had the support
of, at the very least, the United States, if not all of NATO, in pacifying the
rogue region. What reason did they have to believe this? American forces have
been operating within Georgia for months now, helping to train Georgian forces.
Georgian military have been participating as one of the states in President
George W. Bush’s “Coalition of the willing,” and they have
2,000 soldiers currently in Iraq. The United States has significant interests
in Georgia, both in having them join NATO and also the significant oil pipeline
that runs through the state, allowing the United States and other Western states
to pump fuel through the Middle East without Russian or Iranian involvement.
[viii]
Further, the Georgian government has lobbyists in highly important positions.
How important? Try Randy Scheunemann, Senior Foreign Policy Advisor to Senator
John McCain, the presumptive nominee for the Presidency.
Sources:
[i] On the Front Lines in the near Abroad: The CIS and the OSCE in Georgia’s
Civil Wars, S. Neil Macfarlane, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 3, Beyond
UN Subcontracting: Task-Sharing with Regional Security Arrangements and Service-Providing
NGOs (1997), pp. 509-525
[ii] Georgia’s
South Ossetia Conflict: Make Haste Slowly International Crisis Group,
June 7, 2007
[iii] Georgia
tries diplomatic approach to lure back Ossetians, International Herald
Tribune, August 16, 2007
[iv] Why
Georgia’s enclaves would love to follow, but will probably fail, The
Economist, November 27, 2007
[v] Russia
warns of Kosovo repercussions, International Herald Tribune, February
15, 2008
[vi] Q&A: Violence
in South Ossetia, BBC.com, August 8, 2008
[vii] Refugees
Flee to Russia to Escape War in the Caucasus, Deutsche-Welle, August
10, 2008
[viii] US
has political, economic stake in far-flung spat, Associated Press, August
9, 2008
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