BY TAYLOR MARSH
McCain was outspoken in his defense of Musharraf, who has had to contend
with criticisms today from others on the campaign trail, such as Bill Richardson’s
call for a curtailing of U.S. aid to Pakistan. “I continue to
believe Musharraf has done a pretty good job, done a lot of the things that
we wanted him to do,” McCain said, citing Musharraf’s decision
to relinquish his military post, to call elections, and to end martial law.McCain
Outspoken in Defense of Musharraf (late 2007)
Joe Biden takes
McCain to school (late 2007):
To have a real impact on a nation of 165 million, we’ll have to raise our
spending dramatically. A baseline of $1.5 billion annually, for a decade,
is a reasonable place to start. That might sound like a lot – but it’s about
what we spend every week in Iraq. Conditioning security aid– now about three-quarters
of our package– would help push the Pakistani military to finally crush Al
Qaeda and the Taliban.Aid to the Pakistani people should be unconditioned — that is, not subject
to the ups and downs of a particular government in Islamabad or Washington.
But aid to the Pakistani military and intelligence service should be closely
conditioned — that is, carefully calibrated to results. Like it or not, the
Pakistani security services will remain vital players – and our best shot
at finding Bin Laden and shutting down the Taliban. Their performance has
been decidedly mixed: we’ve caught more terrorists in Pakistan than in any
other country– but $10 billion later, Pakistan remains the central base of
Al Qaeda operations. We must strike a much better bargain.A “democracy dividend” – additional assistance in the first year
after democratic rule is restored — would empower Pakistan’s moderate mainstream.
The Bush Administration’s Musharraf First policy was understandable — at
first. Musharraf had broad support, and in the wake of 9/11 he seemed committed
to the fight against Al Qaeda. Six years later, the General is diverting his
military, his police, and his intelligence assets from the fight against the
terrorists to a crackdown on his political opponents.
In a nutshell, from The New York Times today:
… .. The American officials also said there was new information showing
that members of the Pakistani intelligence service were increasingly providing
militants with details about the American campaign against them, in some cases
allowing militants to avoid American missile strikes in Pakistan’s tribal
areas.Concerns about the role played by Pakistani intelligence not only has strained
relations between the United States and Pakistan, a longtime ally, but also
has fanned tensions between Pakistan and its archrival, India. Within days
of the bombings, Indian officials accused the Directorate of Inter-Services
Intelligence, or ISI, of helping to orchestrate the attack in Kabul, which
killed 54, including an Indian defense attaché. …
Juan
Cole has more.
ISI’s collaboration with the neo-Taliban and other guerrilla groups could
not occur without the knowledge and acquiescence of Pakistani president Pervez
Musharraf, who was chief of staff until last fall.
But this is really priceless:
The government officials were guarded in describing the new evidence and
would not say specifically what kind of assistance the ISI officers provided
to the militants. They said that the ISI officers had not been renegades,
indicating that their actions might have been authorized by superiors.
…might have been authorized by superiors? After all these years
can we at least assume that much?
Pakistan’s ISI has been involved with aiding militants in the tribal areas for years.
What is described as an “aha” moment, having proof the ISI is involved
in providing assistance to militants, is more like a “d’oh!”
moment, if you ask me.
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