It’s something Obama and his team will have to decide.
The coming debate on Afghanistan and the policy review the Obama administration will do will happen amidst a fierce conversation among progressives. “Get Afghanistan Right” has been created for just that purpose, arguing against any further military involvement. Once Obama takes office it is sure to get even more intense. No one could suggest with a straight face that military alone will change Afghanistan. At the same time, the same applies to the U.S. having no military presence at all. Obama also has to convince other nations to commit troops in dangerous areas of Afghanistan, with renewed commitment.
Bush’s Iraq-centric focus leaves an inheritance around the world but especially in Afghanistan. A limited troop increase is being reported as “buying time” for Obama and his team to evaluate what should be done next. Amidst that evaluation is the core definition of what comprises America’s strategic interest post-Bush.
There are two main talking points used against increasing U.S. troop levels, though John Kerry did bring up the Vietnam syndrome during HRC’s confirmation hearing. One is obvious and it is what has been wrought in Iraq. Second is the constant refrain from people using the Soviet embarrassment in Afghanistan as prologue and projection. Neither of these reasons work, especially the first, considering Iraq is so totally different and it was completely botched from the start. Ilan Goldenberg of Democracy Arsenal takes it on:
… I don’t disagree that there needs to be a serious discussion of the issues before a large number of troops are deployed into the region. And I am not really sold one way or the other on troop increases.
However, I do think that any discussion, must start with a candid assessment of American interests. And I do think that there is a major difference between the situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan (Particularly in the FATA) and that of Iraq in 2003. In this case what is going on in Afghanistan and Pakistan does in fact present a direct and immediate threat to American security and interests. [...]
As for the Soviet projection on what the U.S. could face, most people arguing this line are simplifying the history and the complexity of what happened back during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. One of the most formidable aspects was Reagan’s C.I.A. Director William Casey. Carter may have signed the directive to move against the pro-Soviet government in Kabul, but the extra legal lengths Casey went to in order to thwart the Soviets is historic. It was a trap that worked beautifully. Robert Gates, who will stay on as Defense Secretary, knows this all too well.
Digging out Steve Coll’s Ghost Wars (pgs. 104-105), I now play stenographer:
At the same time, ISI’s Afghan bureau selected small teams among the mujahedin who would be willing to mount violent sabotage attacks inside Soviet Central Asia. KGB-backed agents had killed hundreds of civilians in terrorist bombings inside Pakistan, and ISI wanted revenge. Mohammed Yousaf, the ISI brigadier who was the Afghan operations chief during this period, recalled that it was Casey who first urged these cross-border assaults during a meeting at ISI headquarters late in 1984… [...]
Robert Gates, Casey’s executive assistant and later CIA director, has confirmed that Afghan rebels “began cross-border operations into the Soviet Union itself” during the spring of 1985. These operations included “raising cain on the Soviet side of the border.” The attacks took place, according to Gates, “with Casey’s encouragement.”
[...] And as Gates reflected later, referring more generally to his sense of mission, Casey had not come to the CIA “with the purpose of making it better… Bill Casey came to the CIA primarily to wage war against the Soviet Union. …
Enter Gorbachev, the self-proclaimed reformer, though at first everyone in the U.S. government doubted it from Reagan on down.
The Soviet Union’s economy was failing. Its technological achievements lagged badly behind the computerized West. … Some analysts captured some of these pressures in their classified reporting, but on the whole the CIA’s analysts understated the Soviet Union’s internal problems. [...] This included the basic insight that the Soviet Union was so decayed as to be near collapse. [...] The Reagan administration was bound by a belief in Soviet power and skepticism about Gorbachev’s reforms. (Steve Coll’s Ghost Wars, pg. 159)

No one should underestimate the challenges in Afghanistan, but if Obama’s commitment against allowing failed states is real, we all need to understand what this means in terms of the Af-Pak region. Is leaving Afghanistan to warring tribalism, as Pakistan continues to spiral downward, in U.S. interests? Are we willing to relegate Afghan women and girls to a pre-9/11 existence, reading stories of acid attacks on school girls, saying how horrible it is, while ignoring the standard that human rights is women’s rights, something that can only manifest with world engagement?
KANDAHAR, AFGHANISTAN — In a country where many crimes against women are still swept under the rug, the case of a 14-year-old girl whose baby was allegedly aborted by her mother and brother using a razor blade has outraged doctors and human-rights workers. [...]
Afghanistan will be a long-term commitment and much more difficult than Iraq. Nobody is happy about it. We either pick up the pieces and do it now. Or be forced to do it later. It’s about adding security so that the other side of the equation, building infrastructure and institutions, revitalizing Afghan agriculture and a host of other necessities can be done.
Helping Afghans continue to build security is the foundation for it all.
President-elect Obama’s national security adviser Gen. Jim Jones on the importance of Afghanistan:
In his own words: “Make no mistake, NATO is not winning in Afghanistan.” — The startling assessment of a study this year led by General Jones for the Atlantic Council of the United States, a nongovernmental organization. He also has said that the war in Iraq caused the United States to “take its eye off the ball” in Afghanistan, and has warned that the consequences of failure are just as serious in Afghanistan as they are in Iraq. “Symbolically, it’s more the epicenter of terrorism than Iraq. If we don’t succeed in Afghanistan, you’re sending a very clear message to the terrorist organizations that the U.S., the U.N. and the 37 countries with troops on the ground can be defeated.”
There is nothing but tough choices ahead.